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1. Introduction 
Where there is a fixed stock of a depletable resource, Pareto optimality 
requires that the difference between price and marginal cost of extraction rise 
at the interest rate. In competitive equilibrium, this condition is fulfilled. A 
monopolist, however, supplies the resource in such a way that the difference 
between marginul recenue and marginal extraction cost rises at the rate of 
interest.’ As a result, a monopolist will not in general supply the resource 
efficiently. Depending on the nature of demand, he may supply either more 
or less rapidly than is required for Pareto optimality. 
Here we address the question of how a government might specify in 
advance a time path of per-unit tax or subsidy rates on quantities supplied 
so as to induce the monopolist to supply the resource efficiently over time.’ 
The principle employed is simple. If the tax or subsidy rate per unit of 
output changes over time in a prespecified way, then the monopoly can in 
general alter the present value of its total tax obligations or subsidy revenue 
by changing the time pattern in which it disposes of its stock of the resource. 
We show that if the competitive path is known and if the profit function is 
concave, then there is an easily described family of tax-subsidy policies that 
would induce a monopoly to follow the efficient production path of a 
competitive industry. Depending on the nature of demand functions it may 
or may not be possible to induce efficiency with a policy that yields a 
positive present value of net taxes collected by the government. We also 
‘The behavior of a monopolistic supplier is thoroughly analyzed in Lewis (1976) and Sweeney 
(1977). 
‘This problem was first posed, as far as we know, by Simmons (1977). Although his paper 
contains a number of interesting remarks on the subject, he was not able to show the essential 
himplicity of the problem. In fact he was somehow led to the assertion that an optimal tax 
schedule would ‘involve initial taxation but with subsidization in later periods’. We show that 
generally the reverse must be true. 
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show that the incidence of a tax is independent of whether it is nominally 
collected from buyers or from sellers, just as in the theory of static 
equilibrium. This fact has interesting implications for the case where buyers 
and sellers live in different countries and thus are not both subject to the 
same taxing authority. 
2. The general model 
Let p(t) and q(t) denote respectively the price and quantity of the 
exhaustible resource supplied at time t. Let f (q(t), t) be the inverse demand 
function, c(q(t), t) be total extraction costs, and c’(q(r), r) be marginal 
extraction costs at time t. Let Q be the stock of the resource available 
initially and let p(t) be the instantaneous interest rate at time t. The standard 
intertemporal ‘arbitrage’ condition informs us that competitive prices and 
quantities, p*(r) and q*(r), must satisfy the following equation so long as 
positive amounts of the resource are being extracted: 
(1) 
Since p*(r)=f’(q*(t), r), eq. (1) can be written as a differential equation in the 
single variable, q* (t ) : 
$Iliq*(i~;f)-c~(q*ir~,t)l=i,(t)ll.(q*(r),rjc’(lr*it)~t)l. (2) 
Assuming that in the competitive equilibrium the depletable resource is 
actually scarce, we have the additional constraint: 
1 q*(r)dr=Q. (3) 
The differential equation (2) with the boundary condition (3) uniquely 
determines the competitive output path, q*(t). 
For a monopoly, profit in the absence of taxes or subsidies is 
If the government pays a subsidy, s(t), (possibly negative) per unit of output 
at time r, then the total profit of the monopolist at time t is 
(5) 
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Throughout the remaining discussion we assume that R ( ., .) is continuous in 
both q and t and twice differentiable with respect to q. Let R’( ., ), R” ( ., ), 
li”( ., .) and H”( ., .) denote derivatives with respect to q. Then we have 
We will assume that: 
R”(q(t),t)<O, for all q(t)>0 and t>O. (7) 
From (6) and (7) it is immediate that: 
n”(q(t),t)<O, for all q(t)>0 and t>O. 
Let B(t)=exp (-Sh p(z)dr) be the discount rate applied to income in time t. 
The monopolist chooses a time path of output, q(t), so as to maximize the 
present value of profit 
(9) 
subject to the constraints 
1 q(tWSQ and q(t)zO, for all tz0. (10) 
Since the function D(q(r), r) is strictly concave in q for all q >O and all 
rz0, and since the constraint function (10) is linear in q(r), it is easy to 
see that there can be no more than one solution to this constrained 
maximization problem. Standard ‘Kuhn-Tucker theory’ applies to this 
problem.3 Therefore necessary and sufficient conditions for q(t) to maximize 
(9) subject to (10) are that for some >.ZO 
n’(~(t),t)0(t)~i., for all tz0 with=if @(t)>O. (11) 
i 4"(t)dtZQ, with = if A > 0. (12) 
Eqs. (11) and (12) are those derived by Lewis (1976) and Sweeney (1977) 
except for the incorporation of taxes in the profit function. 
It follows from the discussion above that a time path of subsidy rates, 
3For a clear account of the applicability of Kuhn-Tucker theory in infinite dimensional 
spaces, see Hurwicz (1964). 
s*(t), will induce a monopolist to behave competitively if and only if, when 
tax rates are set at s*(t). the competitive path q*(t) satisfies eq. (11). (Notice 
that since q*(t) satisfies (3), the conditions for (12) are automatically 
satisfied.) From eqs. (6) and ( 11) we see that q* (t ) will satisfy (1 1) if and only 
if s*(t) is of the form: 
s;(t)= 
K I 
()(p (q*u).t) (13) 
for some constant K. We also see that when s:(t) is chosen, the Lagrangean. 
i., in (11) is equal to K. Conversely, if (12) and (13) are satisfied, then (11) 
holds and since (11) and (12) are sufficient (as well as necessary) conditions 
fol- profit maximization we conclude that for any K 20 the subsidy path 
s:(t) defined by (13) induces a monopolist to supply the competitive path 
q*(t). A government that knows the competitive path. q*(t), the profit 
functions, R( ., .), and the discount rates, U(t), could therefore use (13) to 
calculate an efficiency-inducing tax rate s:(t) corresponding to any choice of 
K 20. In fact, we have shown that the family of tax-rate schedules so defined 
exhausts the possibilities for inducing efficiency by linear tax schedules.’ 
If the subsidy scheme s:(t) is applied. then the present value of the total 
flow of income to the monopolist is 
; [R(q*(t),t)+y*(t).s~(t)]O(~)dt 
h 
=KQ+[ [R(Y*(r).t)-cl*(~)R’(Y*(r),~)]II(t)dt. (14) 
Since R ( . . .) is assumed to be a concave function of q for all t and strictly 
concave when q>O, it must be that R(q*(t),t)-q*(f)R’(q*(t),t)~O for all t, 
with strict inequality when q(t)>O. Therefore the integral expression on the 
right-hand side of eq. (14) is positive. It is then easy to see that for all i?O, 
the monopolist achieves a positive present value of profit by producing q* (t ). 
The Lagrangean multiplier, i., in (11) represents the ‘shadow price’ or 
marginal contribution of an additional unit of the depletable resource to the 
present value of net returns to the monopolist (including taxes or subsidies). 
Since i=K when the subsidy path is s:(t), the quantity KQ measures the 
value of the existing stock of the resource evaluated at its marginal value to 
the monopolist. Thus, one might find it useful to think of the expression on 
the right hand side of (14) for the present value of the monopolist’s income 
as consisting of a part KQ that represents ‘rents’ to its ownership of the 
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resource stock and a part 
attributable to its monopoly position. By setting I< =O. the government can 
drive the after-tax rent accruing to ownership of the resource to zero, but 
there will remain a monopoly profit equal in present value to the integral 
expression on the right-hand side of (14). 
The net present value of subsidies paid by the government is the amount 





The path that minimizes the present value of government outlay from among 
the efficiency-inducing family is then seen to be the path corresponding to 




In general, along the competitice path, industry marginal net revenue 
R’(q* (t), t) can be either positive or negative and E, could also be of either 
sign. If E, is positive, then for all K the subsidy path, s:(t), requires a net 
expenditure (in present value terms) by the government. If E, is negative 
there would always exist a unique K > 0 such that 
E,=l?Q+E,=O (17) 
and thus the net present value of government transfers is zero. 
3. The case of stationary demand and costless extraction 
Qualitative analysis of the optimal paths is much simplified if we assume 
that demand is stationary over time and extraction is costless. We can then 
write the inverse demand function as 
p(t)=F(q(t)). 
We assume that 
(18) 
F’(q(t))<O, whenever q(t)>0 (19) 
and 
c,(y(t),f)=O, for all cl(t)20 and all t20. (20) 
Where extraction is costless. eq. (1) can be solved to give the conventional 
result that the price, p*(t). rises at the discount rate. i’(f). Thus, we have 
p*(t)II(t)=p*(O), for all I with r~(t)>O. (21) 
Since the price, r~*(t), is increasing monotonically over time, and since the 
demand curve and the marginal revenue curve are both assumed to slope 
downward, it follows that marginal revenue must increase over time as prices 
and quantities follow the efficient paths p*(t) and cl*(t). But since ,sx (t) is 
just the negative of marginal revenue at output l/*(t), it must then be that 
s:(t) decreases monotonically 
R’(y*(t))=p*(t) I++’ c 1 5*(t) ’ (22) 
where t*(t) is the price elasticity of demand at time t. Using eqs. (3). (16), 
(21) and (22) one obtains: 
1 
(23) 
Thus, E, is positive or negative depending on whether the quantity 
weighted average inverse elasticity of demand is larger or smaller than one in 
absolute value. 
As Stiglitz (1976) observed, if the elasticity of demand for a depletable 
resource is constant (and greater than unity in absolute value) then a 
monopolist will offer the same quantities and charge the same prices as a 
competitive industry would. Marshall (1920) argued that. ordinarily, demand 
curves can be expected to have the property that the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of demand is an increasing function of price. While this is not 
true of all demand curves consistent with demand theory. it is true for an 
interc\ting class cjf cases (includin g the ca\e of linear demand). We say that 
demand functions with this property have ‘Marshallian elasticity of demand’. 
Lewis (1976) shows that if the elasticity of demand is Marshallian at all 
prices, then a monopolist will extract the resource more slowly than is 
Pareto efficient. Lewis, Matthews and Burness (1979) demonstrate that non- 
Marshallian elasticity of demand is consistent with concave profit functions. 
They also show that during time-periods when the elasticity of demand is 
non-Marshallian, a monopolist will extract more rapidly than is efficient. 
The effects of a subsidy on the time path of the monopoly extraction rate 
can be usefully viewed as follows. By altering the time path of extraction, the 
monopolist can alter the present value of the total amount of subsidy 
received in the process of extracting the total amount Q. Thus, if the present 
value of the subsidy rate, s(r)e(t), is constant over time he will receive the 
same present value of subsidy no matter when he extracts. If s(t )0(t) is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of t then he will receive more subsidy the 
sooner (later) he extracts his reserves. 
For this reason we want to look at the time path of sE(t)U(t). Using eqs. 
(13), (21) and (22) we find 
Therefore 
(24) 
~0, and is 
constant if l*(r) = 0. 
Where the elasticity of demand is a constant, there is no need to use 
government intervention to bring about an efficient output stream so long as 
<< - 1. This is not surprising since, as we remarked above, in this case the 
monopoly solution is the same as the competitive solution. Of course a tax 
schedule, s:(t), which in this case is neutral, could be used to raise revenue 
for the government. 
In the case of Marshallian elasticity of demand, the fact that p*(t) 
increases over time implies that t*(r)<O. Thus, the present value of the 
subsidy rate, sg(r)H(r), must be falling over time. This will encourage the 
monopolist to extract earlier than he would have done if there were no 
subsidy. This direction of effect is to be expected since it is in the case where 
t*(r)<0 that the untaxed monopolist extracts too slowly. 
In the non-Marshallian case. studied by Lewis et al., we have l*(r)>0 so 
that the present value of the subsidy rate increases over time. Thus, the 
monopolist is encouraged to produce more slowly than he would have done 
if there were no subsidies or taxes. This again seems reasonable since in this 
case Lewis et al. show that the monopolist, if left alone, would extract too 
quickly. As before, the undiscounted tax rate rises over time (since the 
marginal revenue even in this case falls over time): however, the rate of 
increase of the tax rate is lower than the rate of interest. 
4. Taxing consumers rather than producers 
The discussion in the preceding sections is conducted in terms of a subsidy 
(tax) paid to (by) the supplier. Those familiar with the simple analytics of 
commodity taxation in static analysis will not be surprised to learn that in 
our case the incidence of such a tax is the same whether it is collected from 
the supplier or from the consumer. To demonstrate this formally we observe 
the following. If the monopolist receives (j(r) per unit sold at time t and the 
consumer receives a subsidy (possibly negative) of s(t) per unit, then the net 
price to consumers is i(t)-s(t) per unit. The inverse demand function 
j’(~(r), t ) registers the net price to consumers at which the quantity (f(r) can 
be sold in period t. Thus. (j(t)-s(t)= f’(ll(t),f). Therefore fi(t)=.f‘(q(f),t) 
+ s (r ) and the profit of the firm is 
where R(q(r).l) is defined as in (4). We see from (26) and (5) that monopoly 
profits are precisely the same function of the output path, y(t), whether the 
tax is collected from the monopoly or from the consumers. Therefore the 
monopolist chooses the same time path, (i(t), of output and receives the same 
profit in each period in either case. 
This fact has an interesting practical implication if consumers live in a 
different tax jurisdiction from the monopoly and its resource. Even if the 
consuming country has no legal authority to tax the monopolist directly, it 
can achieve the same results by taxing or subsidizing consumers. Typically. 
of course, consumers of a depletable resource will be located in many 
different countries. Therefore a unified subsidy-tax policy is probably not to 
be reasonably expected. In another paper. Bergstrom (1980) treats a model 
with noncooperative behavior by consuming countries each of which has 
taxing authority over its own citizens. 
Appendix: An example- linear demand functions 
Suppose that we retain our assumptions that the demand function is 
stationary and extraction is costless, and add the restrictions that demand is 
linear and the interest rate is constant. With an appropriate choice of units 
of measurement for the depletable resource and for money. we can write the 
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demand function as 
4(t)=max[O, 1 -p(f)], for p(t)zO. (A.l) 
The competitive solution is as follows. With a constant discount rate, the 
arbitrage equation is 
p*(t)=po*ep’, (A.21 
where pX is the value of p*(O). It follows that 
q*(t)=max[O, 1 -&e@]. (A.3) 
Let T be the earliest date at which q* (t) = 0. Then 
and 




Since the total stock of resources must be just exhausted at time 7: it 
follows that 
by*(r)dt=Q. (A.6) 
Substituting from (A.3))(A.6) and integrating, we obtain 
p;-lnp,*-l=pQ. (A.7) 
The left-hand side of (A.7) is a monotone decreasing function of p. with 
domain (0, l] and range (;c,O]. Therefore the solution, pi, is uniquely 
determined by the product, pQ 2 0. 
In the case of linear demand, any efficiency-inducing tax subsidy scheme 
must take the form 
sE(t)=KeD’-[2p*(t)-l]=(K-2)p,*ePL+1. (A.8) 
The present value of the total subsidy paid to the monopolist is 
-1 
EK=KQ-i [l -p*(t)][2p*(t)- l]e-P’dt. 
0 
(A.9) 
32 TC. Bergstrom et al., .Sfficiency-inducing taxation 
Performing the integration, and using (A.4) and (A.7) 
(A.10) 
Whether the tax,subsidy results in positive or negative net revenue to the 
government depends upon the value of the bracketed expression in (A.lO) 
and the value chosen for K. If the bracketed expression is positive. for 
example, then even with K =0 the government is forced into a position of 
providing a net subsidy to the industry in present value terms. Some 
elementary calculus and computations with a pocket calculator show that the 
bracketed expression is positive if p$ ~0.355 (which occurs when PQ >0.391) 
and negative if pt > 0.355 and PQ ~0.391. ‘Thus, it is possible to accomplish 
efficiency by means of a tax-subsidy scheme at no net cost to the government 
only if Q is not ‘too large’. 
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